Delaware Section 102(b)(7): A Statutory Response to the Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis by Behrens, James B.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 65 Issue 2 
1987 
Delaware Section 102(b)(7): A Statutory Response to the Director 
and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis 
James B. Behrens 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Insurance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James B. Behrens, Delaware Section 102(b)(7): A Statutory Response to the Director and Officer Liability 
Insurance Crisis, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 481 (1987). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss2/7 
This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University 
Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DELAWARE SECTION 102(b)(7): A STATUTORY RESPONSE TO
THE DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
INSURANCE CRISIS
The director and officer liability insurance crisis is a major concern to
many executives.' A recent survey by Peat Marwick and the National
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) reveals that small to mid-
size companies, not-for-profit organizations, public companies, financial
institutions, chemical companies, hazardous waste firms and some high
tech companies have experienced significant increases in director resigna-
tions.2 Many executives are loathe to serve as corporate directors in to-
day's litigious environment because they fear becoming the target of
lawsuits. The increased incidence of suits against corporate directors has
also prompted suggestions that potential directors be screened more rig-
orously for independence and expertise. These reforms only promise to
compound the current director shortage.3
Several protections have arisen to ease director concerns over personal
liability.4 The most significant legal development is the trend of states to
modify or enact indemnification statutes to permit the use of corporate
1. See Neff, Liability Panic in the Board Room, WALL ST. J. Nov. 10, 1986 at P.3, col. 2.
Corporate Boardroom Woes Grow, NAT. L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 29 (a 1985 study found 68 percent of
592 companies whose insurance was up for renewal face premium hikes averaging 362 percent).
The director and officer liability insurance crisis is only part of a larger insurance problem facing
the professional community at large. Rising premiums and policy cancellations are predominant
and are worrying a wide variety of economic enterprises including doctors, lawyers, accountants,
hospitals, dayeare centers and school districts. See generally Hunter and Borzilleri, The Liability
Insurance Crisis, 22 TRIAL April 1986, at 42.
2. See Nash, Walking the Boardroom Tightrope, WORLD, April-June 1987 at 46 (J.M. Nash is
President of the Washington, D.C. based NACD) (WORLD is a published quarterly by Peat
Marwick).
3. The overall concern about D & 0 liability is heightened by new requirements of the
National Association of Securities Dealers that its listed companies must have two outside
directors, and by a Treadway Commission proposal that the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission requires all registered public companies to have audit committees composed en-
tirely of independent directors. The situation becomes even more complex when one
envisions the potential for legislation that would virtually "license" the duties and respon-
sibilities of directors. For example, there is now debate at the federal and state level over
whether to certify directors as qualified to serve. In other words, they may have to prove
specific expertise.
Id.
4. Id. While restricted insurance coverages entering the director and officer insurance liability
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funds to pay money judgments and costs incurred by directors in defend-
ing suits.
The pervasiveness of Delaware chartered corporations nationwide
makes Delaware's recently enacted provision significant.' This develop-
ment discusses the mechanics and policy behind Delaware's new statute,
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code.6 After comparing Section
102(b)(7) with other state indemnification provisions, this development
concludes with some data on the effect of Delaware's provision on corpo-
rate boards and shareholders.
Most state indemnification provisions resemble Delaware's Section
145(a). 7 Section 145(a) allows a corporation to indemnify a director, of-
ficer, employee or agent for amounts paid in settlement "if [he is] reason-
ably believed to be [acting] in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation...." 8 Statutes like Section 145(a), however, do not protect
directors who negligently or intentionally breach their duty to the corpo-
ration or its shareholders.
Section 102(b)(7)-type statutes broaden the scope of director protec-
tion by permitting corporations to shield directors from liability for
grossly negligent acts. This type of statute differs from the typical in-
demnification provision because it affects the shareholder's cause of ac-
tion. In contrast, indemnification statutes do not limit a shareholder's
right to recover from a corporate director. In jurisdictions that have en-
market are easing the liability insurance availability problem, there remains insufficient coverage to
meet the need.
5. Approximately half of the Fortune 500 companies and 40 percent of those listed on the
New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Delaware. See WALL ST. J., June 19, 1986, at 8.
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1986). See infra note 9 for text.
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983). See also REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION
AcT (RMBCA) § 8.51-.52 (1983). RMBCA § 8.51 provides that a corporation may indemnify a
director against liability if the director acted in good faith and, in the case of conduct in his official
capacity, he reasonably believed his conduct was in the corporation's best interests. RMBCA § 8.52
requires a corporation to indemnify a director who was wholly successful on the merits or otherwise
against reasonable expenses incurred in defending any proceeding. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721
(Consol. 1983 & Supp. 1986), infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text; Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.355(7) (1986).
8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983 & Supp. 1986). Most indemnification statutes also
authorize a corporation to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of its directors and officers.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983 & Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.75(g)
(1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.355(8) (1986).
Most director and officer liability insurance policies require the insureds to bear five percent of
each loss at their own risk. Furthermore, if the application for insurance contains misrepresenta-
tions the insurance company may be able to rescind the policy. See, e.g., Bird v. Penn Central Co.,
334 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1971), motion denied on rehearing, 341 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
[Vol. 65:481
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acted 102(b)(7)-type statutes a director's exposure to personal liability is
limited to his intentional misconduct in managing the corporation.
Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) expressly enables a corporation to amend
its articles of incorporation to include "[a] provision eliminating or limit-
ing the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockhold-
ers for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as director .... 9
This provision, however, is limited to those cases where shareholders ac-
cuse directors of violating their duty of care.'0 Section 102(b)(7) does not
permit a corporation to shield directors from liability for: (1) breaches of
their duty of loyalty;" (2) any acts or omissions done in bad faith or
knowingly in violation of the law; 12 (3) unlawful payment of dividends or
unlawful stock repurchases or redemptions; or (4) transactions from
which the director received improper personal benefit. '3 In those corpo-
rations which adopt 102(b)(7)-type provisions, the shareholders bringing
suit bear the burden of proving that the challenged conduct of the direc-
tor falls outside the scope of coverage.
Section 102(b)(7) is only an enabling provision and therefore is simul-
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1986) in its entirety provides that the
certificate of incorporation of any corporation may contain
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or
its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided
that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director (i) for any breach
of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omis-
sions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law, (iii) under section 174 of this Title, or (iv) for any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liabil-
ity of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision
becomes effective. All references in this subsection to a director shall also be deemed to
refer to a member of the governing body of a corporation which is not authorized to issue
capital stock.
When Delaware enacted Section 102(b)(7), it also enacted DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 1450) (1983
& Supp. 1986). Section 1450) extends a corporation's obligation to indemnify and advance expenses
for costs of defending suits arising from acts of directors beyond the date of resignation.
10. Duty of care refers to negligent decisionmaking.
11. Duty of loyalty addresses those situations where a director has a conflict of interest with the
corporation or where he may be engaged in self-dealing.
12, When a director has committed an intentional wrong, the complaining shareholders may
ask for punitive damages. Courts are split as to whether a corporation may insure a director for
punitive changes. Compare Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.
1962) with Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910
(1977).
13. See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers,
33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 1994 (1978) (Under certain circumstances indemnification would violate public
policy. Statutes should "seek the middle ground between encouraging fiduciaries to violate their
trust, and discouraging them from serving at all.").
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taneously restrictive and flexible. The provision merely authorizes share-
holder approval of a charter amendment which limits or precludes
director liability for breaches of their duty of care. The extent to which
shareholders may protect directors is flexible. Shareholders may choose
to entirely eliminate director liability for breaches of fiduciary duty or
may limit the corporation's indemnification obligation to a stated dollar
maximum.14 Moreover, shareholders remain free to condition the elimi-
nation of liability on the performance of specific actions by directors or to
deny the protection of the statute in connection with some types of trans-
actions while permitting it in others.15
Section 102(b)(7) operates only when monetary judgments are assessed
against directors. It has no effect on the availability of equitable remedies
like injunction or rescission which may become available upon a direc-
tor's breach of his duty of care.16 The ability of shareholders to seek
equitable relief, however, does not threaten the personal assets of direc-
tors. Thus, the fact that Section 102(b)(7) does not shield directors from
14. In enacting § 102(b)(7), the Delaware legislature rejected providing a statutory "cap" for
the personal liability of directors because this approach would fix the remedy for liability in an
arbitrary amount unrelated to the facts of each case. Under § 102(b)(7), corporate shareholders may
choose to fix any amount it wants as a "cap" on liability and it may determine each particular "cap"
according to the particular transaction at issue. See Bus. LAW, July/Aug. 1986, at 203.
The idea of putting a statutory "cap" on a director's potential liability is not a new concept. At
least one commentator several years ago argued that directors, in the case of simple or even gross
negligence, should have an idea of what their maximum liability could be. See Johnston, Corporate
Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW at 2032.
15. The Delaware legislature rejected a proposal to amend § 145(b) of its indemnification stat-
ute which would have allowed indemnification ofjudgments or amounts paid in settlement in deriva-
tive suits. The stockholders would not have benefited under the proposal because the corporation
would simply be paying itself for injuries its directors caused. See Bus. LAW, July/Aug. 1986, at 2.
Under § 145(c) of the Delaware indemnification statute, and other state indemnification statutes, a
corporation must indemnify a director who has been successful on the merits or otherwise. These
statutes have led to questionable results, at least in terms of policy, when applied to a director's
defense against criminal actions. For instance, in Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321
A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), the court held that any result other than conviction in a criminal
proceeding was a success on the merits. Id. at 141. In Merritt-Chapman, the defendant directors
were charged with five criminal counts. Two of the directors agreed not to pursue their defenses
under two of the counts in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement to drop the other charges. The
court held that the corporation had to indemnify those directors for their legal costs incurred in
defending the charges that were subsequently dropped. Id. at 144. In doing so the court rejected the
corporation's argument that it should not have to indemnify the directors because there had been no
finding of the directors' innocence. Id. at 141.
16. Because the Delaware statute does not affect equitable remedies, it will not affect cases
concerning elections, proxy contests, resignations, and removal contests.
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liability in equity does not make the provision a less effective means of
encouraging individuals to serve as corporate directors.
Other states have passed legislation which seeks to alleviate director
concerns about personal liability but which differs from Section
102(b)(7). For example, New Jersey's recent enactment permits New
Jersey corporations to include in their certificate of incorporation a pro-
vision that limits, either partially or entirely, the liability of officers, em-
ployees or agents, as well as directors, to the corporation or its
shareholders. 7 New Jersey corporations must either authorize the new
statute in their certificates of incorporation or obtain shareholder ap-
proval.1 8 The New Jersey provision, like Delaware's, denies relief for an
act or omission: (1) in breach of the person's duty of loyalty to the cor-
poration or its shareholders; (2) made in bad faith or in knowing viola-
tion of the law; or (3) resulting in receipt of an improper personal
benefit. t9
New York has given corporations chartered under its laws the power
to indemnify directors and officers.20 New York's Section 72121 permits
a corporation to expand its indemnification provision by a resolution of
shareholders, directors or by agreement.22 Like Delaware and New
Jersey, New York also prohibits corporate indemnification when a direc-
tor acted in bad faith, was deliberately dishonest or when he made a
17. See New Jersey Senate Bill No. 2510 (enacted Feb. 4, 1987) reprinted in 19 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 301 (Feb. 13, 1987).
Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) only protects directors. Two Delaware commentators have sug-
gested that officer protection was not needed because officers of Delaware corporations who enact
the statute are likely to take every controversial decision before the board of directors. The officers
could thus shield themselves from personal liability by shifting the responsibility to the directors.
Black and Sparks, infra note 20, at 312. The portion of the New Jersey law pertaining to limiting the
liability of officers is subject to "sunset" provisions and will expire after two years unless the legisla-
ture extends this protection. 19 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 301 (Feb. 27, 1987).
18. 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 301 (Feb. 27, 1987).
19. Id. In addition to permitting corporate indemnity of directors, officers, employees and
agents, the New Jersey Act permits corporations to purchase insurance on behalf of its agents. The
remainder of the Act permits banks and capital stock savings banks to limit the liability of directors
and officers by providing for indemnification in their certificate of incorporation.
20. A committee of the Delaware Corporate Law Section considered legislation which would
greatly expand the power of Delaware corporations to indemnify their directors and officers. The
committees, however, decided that legislation permitting shareholders to limit director liability was a
more direct approach to the D & 0 liability insurance problems. See Black and Sparks, Analysis of
the 1986 Amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law, Prentice-Hall, Inc., July 29, 1986, p. 311.
21. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721 (Consol. 1983 & Supp. 1986).
22. Id.
1987]
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personal gain that he was not legally entitled to.23
Although there are differences in language, construction and scope,
Delaware's new provision has undoubtedly prompted a trend in state
corporate indemnity legislation. As of March 1987, twenty-one states
had introduced legislation permitting corporations to eliminate or limit
director liability in certain circumstances.24 Additionally, three states
had introduced legislation which would permit charitable and not-for-
profit corporations to limit the liability of their directors.25 In contrast,
Hawaii has introduced a bill which would statutorily prescribe standards
for director actions.26 Of course, if enacted, Hawaii's statutory scope of
acceptable activity will dictate director exposure to personal liability.
23. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721 (Consol. 1983 & Supp. 1986) provides as follows:
NONEXCLUSIVITY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR INDEMNIFICATION
OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS-The indemnification and advancement of expenses
granted pursuant to, or provided by, this article shall not be deemed exclusive of any other
rights to which a director or officer seeking indemnification or advancement of expenses
may be entitled, whether-contained in the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws or,
when authorized by such certificate of incorporation or by-laws, (i) a resolution of share-
holders, (ii) a resolution of directors, or (iii) an agreement providing for such indemnifica-
tion, provided that no indemnification may be made to or on behalf of any director or
officer if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to the director or officer establishes
that his acts were committed in bad faith or were the result of active and deliberate dishon-
esty and were material to the cause of action so adjudicated, or that he personally gained in
fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he was not legally entitled. Nothing
contained in this article shall affect any rights to indemnification to which corporate per-
sonnel other than directors and officers may be entitled by contract or otherwise under law.
See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.355(7) (1986). Missouri's indemnification statute is similar to
New York's Section 721. A Missouri corporation may indemnify their directors, officers, employees
or agents. Missouri requires that indemnity provisions be authorized in the corporation's articles of
incorporation, by-laws or in an agreement adopted by shareholder vote. Like Delaware and New
York, Missouri prohibits director indemnification when that person has been knowingly fraudulent,
deliberately dishonest or has committed willful misconduct. Id. Recently, Missouri has considered
legislation which would make directors immune from suit arising "from conduct of the affairs of [the
corporation]." See 19 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 179 (Jan. 30, 1987).
24. The twenty-one states are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See 19
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 384-85 (March 13, 1987); 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 345-47
(March 6, 1987); 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 267-68 (Feb. 20, 1987); 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 203 (Feb. 6, 1987).
According to Mr. Lewis S. Black, Jr., of the Delaware law firm Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell,
states may be using different terminology in their new proposed statutes, but they are using the
Delaware statute as a starting point. Telephone interview with Mr. Lewis S. Black, Jr., member of
Delaware Bar, Partner, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell (March 26, 1987).
25. The three states are Arizona, Montana and Vermont. See 19 SEc. RaG. & L. REP. (BNA)
346-47 (March 6, 1987); 19 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 267-68 (Feb. 20, 1987).
26. See 19 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 385 (March 13, 1987).
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While a statutory standard could protect directors from personal lia-
bility to the corporation or its shareholders, legislatures favor giving the
shareholders or the corporation an option to limit director liability. Ac-
cordingly, where permitted, corporations must take steps to limit direc-
tor liability, usually by shareholder vote or, for new corporations, in
drafting the articles of incorporation.
Since Delaware's indemnity statute was the first of its kind, enactment
of this statute by Delaware corporations may foretell whether corpora-
tions and shareholders nationwide are likely to sanction director liability
and indemnification provisions. Whether Delaware's Section 102(b)(7)
will result in widespread adoption of similar statutes is not yet certain.2 7
Nonetheless, there is encouraging evidence that the statute will have its
desired effect. Some corporations have already received shareholder ap-
proval and added a Section 102(b)(7)-type provision to their articles of
incorporation. 28 One commentator sees most of these corporations limit-
ing director liability to the fullest extent permitted by law rather than
adopting caps or conditional indemnity.29
Many more corporations are currently seeking shareholder approval to
shield their corporate boards. According to one report, more than two-
thirds of Delaware corporations are proposing Section 102(b)(7)-type
provisions to their shareholders.3° Moreover, some suggest that enact-
ment of these statutes will remain the most popular proxy item for the
next few years.31
27. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at 26, col. 1. According to Marie Shultie, Delaware's Corpora-
tion Administrator, about two hundred corporations a month were filing changes in their certificates
of incorporation to take advantage of the Delaware statute. This number was expected to be much
higher during the Spring months in 1987 after shareholders returned their proxies. Id.
28. Such corporations include Health Management Associates Inc. (see 1987 Business Wire,
March 24, 1987, available on Nexis News Service); Tejon Ranch Co. (see 1987 Business Wire, March
24, 1987, available on Nexis News Service); Synercom Technology Inc. (see 1987 Business Wire,
March 12, 1987, available on Nexis News Service); Penril Corp. (see PR Newswire, March 2, 1987,
available on Nexis News Service); Holiday Corporation (see 1987 Business Wire, Feb. 27, 1987,
available on Nexis News Service); Hudson Foods (see PR Newswire, Feb. 6, 1987, available on Nexis
News Service); and Resource Exploration Inc. (see 1987 Business Wire, Jan. 28, 1987, available on
Nexis News Service).
Tejon Ranch Co. recently reincorporated in Delaware and the new certificate of incorporation will
eliminate director liability "to the maximum extent permitted by Delaware law." The company
reports that limiting its directors' liability will enhance its ability to attract high quality directors.
Tejon also believes that this limitation may also eventually reduce insurance costs. See 1987 Busi-
ness Wire, March 24, 1987, available on Nexis News Service.
29. Telephone interview with Mr. Lewis S. Black, Jr., supra note 24.
30. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1987, at 26, col. 1.
31. Telephone interview with Mr. Lewis S. Black, Jr., supra note 24.
1987]
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Although a trend toward adopting Section 102(b)(7)-type provisions is
not yet evident, its widespread proposal signifies Delaware corporate
board confidence that it will ease director concerns over personal liabil-
ity. Moreover, widespread enactment of Section 102(b)(7)-type provi-
sions by state legislatures and a corresponding adoption of indemnity
provisions by corporations nationwide could remove the need of many
directors to retain costly indemnity insurance.
James B. Behrens
THE URGENT NEED FOR SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
An estimated ten to fifteen percent of all married couples are infertile.'
The rate of infertility has increased dramatically over the past 20 years.2
The rise in infertility is due to a variety of causes including use of certain
drugs and contraceptive devices,3 sexually transmitted diseases, 4 chemi-
1. L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTIL-
rTY TREATMENTS, INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND SUR-
ROGATE MOTHERHOOD, 2 (1984). Approximately 15% of couples are unable to conceive after one
year of unprotected intercourse. R. HATCHER & G. STEWARD, CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY
1986-1987 (13th rev. ed. 1986).
2. The overall infertility rate in the United States is almost three times as much as it was 20
years ago. The Saddest Epidemic, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 50. The National Center for Health
Statistics compared a 1965 survey with a 1976 survey and found an 83% increase in infertility
among married couples in which the wife was 20-24 years old, a group which is considered most
fertile. L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 2.
3. A variety of drugs including high blood pressure and ulcer medications can lower a man's
sperm production. Sons and daughters of women who took DES (di-ethyl-stilbestrol) have a higher
incidence of certain types of fertility problems. L. ANDREWS, supra note I, at 23-25. Use of the
IUD sometimes leads to infertility by causing severe inflammation of the uterine lining or by increas-
ing a woman's risk of pelvic inflammatory disease which causes scarring and blockage of a woman's
fallopian tubes. Id. at 25-26. Abortion can also cause infections which can lead to infertility. Id. at
26.
4. According to Centers for Disease Control, one million people contract sexually transmitted
diseases each year. Infertility results in 150,000 to 200,000 of those cases. Sexually transmitted
diseases lead to infertility by scarring the woman's fallopian tubes or the man's sperm ducts. Id. at
29.
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